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RILEY V. CALIFORNIA—
CELL PHONES AND TECHNOLOGY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Kelly Ozurovich∗
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well settled that law enforcement officials may search an
arrestee’s person and surrounding area under his control without a
warrant when the search is incident to the arrest itself.1 However,
recent courts have grappled with applying this doctrine to searches in
the modern era in which most people carry on their persons cell
phones with powerful capabilities that have only recently
developed.2 Courts are forced to apply a doctrine designed with
tangible evidence in mind to devices that digitally, or non-tangibly,
store immense amounts of data with little direction from the Supreme
Court.3
In its recent decision Riley v. California,4 the Supreme Court
finally addressed the impact technology is having on the Fourth
Amendment’s “search incident to arrest” doctrine and the growing
privacy concerns plaguing the courts. The Court considered two
cases presenting a similar question—whether law enforcement can
conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone—and

∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science,
Yale University, May 2011. I would like to thank Professor Samantha Buckingham for her hard
work and input in creating this finished product.
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2472, 2482–83 (2014); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 224 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755, 768 (1969); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
2. Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Issues Bold Decision on Cell Phone Privacy,
THINKPROGRESS (June 25, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/06/25
/3453015/the-supreme-court-finally-starts-to-bring-privacy-into-the-21st-century/.
3. Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27,
36 (2008).
4. 134 S. Ct. 2472 (2014).
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determined that it could not.5 It came to the correct conclusion that
law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to searching the
contents of a cell phone due to the vast amount of personal
information contained in this device. In so doing, it partially brought
the Fourth Amendment into the twenty-first century. At the same
time, however, the Supreme Court hampered the progress it could
have made by limiting its decision to cell phones instead of including
other devices that also implement smart technology (“smart
devices”), which present similar privacy concerns. By limiting its
decision, the Court created the potential for future litigation and
resulting circuit splits when lower courts try to apply the search
incident to arrest doctrine to other smart devices located on an
arrestee’s person, such as iPads, Apple Watches, Kindles, and the
like.6
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Riley v. California, focusing both on its accomplishments and its
forfeitures, and seeks to provide a solution that could have more fully
brought the Fourth Amendment into the modern era. Part II discusses
the evolution of warrantless searches incident to arrest as reasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment. Part III details the two cases
considered in the Supreme Court’s decision, People v. Riley7 and
United States v. Wurie.8 Part IV addresses the Court’s reasoning in
concluding that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.9
Part V propounds that the Supreme Court came to the correct
conclusion with respect to cell phones due to the colossal amount of
personal data stored in these devices. However, this part advocates
that while the Supreme Court made important advances, it hindered
itself from achieving resolution on warrantless searches of various
other smart devices that are likely to present future issues if left
unresolved. This part thus offers an alternative way to frame the
issue before the Court that would better address present and future
5. Id. at 2482, 2495.
6. These devices are all equipped with wireless Internet browsing, have significant storage
capacity, and many make use of Global Positioning Systems (GPS). For further discussion of
these devices, see infra Part V.B.1 and notes 104–108.
7. No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d in part sub nom.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
8. 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
9. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
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concerns about both cell phones and non-cell phone smart devices.
Part VI concludes that the Supreme Court took an important step
toward bringing the Fourth Amendment into the present but left open
certain questions that will likely result in future litigation.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK—THE SEARCH
INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment establishes “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” and protects the
people from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”10 Generally, a
search is unreasonable when it occurs without a warrant.11 However,
a long-standing exception to the warrant requirement, first discussed
in Weeks v. United States,12 is a search conducted incident to an
arrest.13 Known as the search incident to arrest doctrine, this
exception permits law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search
of an arrestee, which includes a search of both the person arrested
and the surrounding area under his control.14
Since Weeks, several Supreme Court cases have further
developed the search incident to arrest doctrine. First, in Chimel v.
California,15 the Court proffered two rationales for the warrantless
search of a person and his surrounding area incident to an arrest.16
The first rationale is to protect the officer’s safety.17 Under this
rationale, law enforcement is reasonable in searching the arrestee or
the area under his immediate control for any weapons the arrestee
could use against law enforcement or to implement an escape.18 The
second rationale is to prevent the destruction or concealment of
evidence.19 Thus, in Chimel, the Court suppressed evidence police
officers obtained when they conducted an expansive search incident
to arrest of the arrestee’s entire three-bedroom house, including areas
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. Id. at 392; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
14. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Agnello, 269
U.S. at 30.
15. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
16. Id. at 763.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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beyond the arrestee’s immediate control, because the search did not
accomplish or further either of the aforementioned rationales.20
Several years later, in United States v. Robinson,21 the Supreme
Court expanded the search incident to arrest doctrine.22 In Robinson,
the court considered a warrantless search incident to arrest where the
police had seized a cigarette pack found on the arrestee’s person,
searched the contents of the cigarette pack, located heroin capsules
inside, and charged the arrestee with narcotics possession, admitting
into evidence the heroin capsules.23 In determining whether the
search violated the Fourth Amendment, and ultimately concluding it
did not, the Court considered the Chimel justifications.24 It
propounded, however, that so long as the arrest is lawful and based
on probable cause, “a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification.”25 Rather,
[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the
authority to search, and . . . in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is
also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.26
Finally, in Arizona v. Gant,27 the Supreme Court expanded the
search incident to arrest doctrine as applied to searches of vehicles.28
The Court determined that with respect to persons arrested while
driving a vehicle, law enforcement can search the vehicle pursuant to
an arrest if the officers have a reasonable belief that evidence of the
crime of arrest is located inside the vehicle.29
The current state of the search incident to arrest doctrine as
applied to devices containing digital data has created a complicated
issue for courts. The Supreme Court tried to answer this question in
Riley v. California, at least as applied to cell phones.

20. Id.
21. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
22. See id. at 235.
23. Id. at 223.
24. Id. at 235.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 335 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
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III. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA AND UNITED STATES V. WURIE
The recent Supreme Court case Riley v. California considers two
cases that present what the Court considered a common issue:
“whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been
arrested.”30 The first case, People v. Riley, came up from California
state court.31 The plaintiff, David Riley, challenged admission of
photographs and videos obtained during a warrantless search of his
cell phone.32 A police officer stopped Riley for driving with expired
registration tags.33 During the course of the stop, the officer learned
that Riley had been driving with a suspended license.34 Thus, the
officer arrested Riley and, in accordance with law enforcement
protocol, impounded his car, at which point “another officer
conducted an inventory search of the car.”35
The officers found firearms inside the car and paraphernalia that
suggested Riley was a gang member.36 Inside Riley’s pocket, the
officers also found a smartphone and searched through its content
without a warrant, finding additional references to a gang in the
phone’s data.37 Approximately two hours after the arrest, while at the
police station, a detective specializing in gang-related crimes further
searched the phone’s data, finding incriminating photos and videos.38
The police officer found a photograph of Riley standing in front
of a car that was suspected to have been involved in a shooting a few
weeks prior.39 Riley was charged for his actions in connection with
the shooting.40 In his defense, Riley attempted to suppress the
evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his cell phone, but
the trial court rejected his argument and admitted the evidence.41
Riley was convicted on all counts.42 The California Court of Appeal
30. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
31. See People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013),
rev’d in part sub nom. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
32. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.
33. Id. at 2480.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2480–81.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2481.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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affirmed and the California Supreme Court denied Riley’s petition to
review the decision.43 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.44
Originating from the First Circuit Court of Appeals, United
States v. Wurie also considered law enforcement’s search of a cell
phone incident to arrest.45 In this second case, a police officer
witnessed the defendant, Wurie, engage in a narcotics transaction.46
He arrested Wurie and took him to the police station, where officers
located and seized two cell phones from his possession.47 While at
the station, one of the phones, a flip phone, repeatedly rang from a
number the officers could see from the external screen was labeled
“my house.”48
The officers opened the phone without a warrant and noticed a
picture of a woman and a baby on the screen of the phone.49 The
officers searched through the call log and presumably the contact
information to locate the number associated with the name “my
house.”50 Upon locating the number, the officers traced it to an
apartment building and proceeded to that apartment building where
they noticed through a window a woman resembling the picture on
the cell phone inside the apartment.51 The officers secured the
apartment and obtained a warrant to search its contents.52 Inside, the
police located narcotics and other “drug paraphernalia, a firearm and
ammunition, and cash.”53
Subsequently, Wurie was charged with possession of narcotics
with intent to distribute and “being a felon in possession of a firearm
and ammunition.”54 Like Riley, Wurie moved to suppress any
evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his cell phone.55
The District Court denied the motion, and Wurie was convicted on
all counts.56 The First Circuit reversed the lower court’s denial of
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2481–82.
Id. at 2481.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2482.
Id.
Id.
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Wurie’s motion to suppress and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.57
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING—
CONSIDERING THESE TWO CASES TOGETHER
The Supreme Court considered these two cases together because
they presented a common issue: the reasonableness of a warrantless
search of a cell phone incident to an arrest.58 In a unanimous
opinion,59 the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that warrantless
searches of cell phones are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and thus the evidence obtained via the searches of the
cell phones incident to the arrests was suppressed in both cases.60
Chief Justice Roberts made this conclusion explicit: “Our answer to
the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone
seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”61
The Supreme Court came to this conclusion for three reasons.
First, it addressed the two rationales for warrantless searches incident
to arrest found in Chimel.62 In applying Chimel, the Court asked
“whether application of the search incident to arrest doctrine to this
particular category of effects would ‘untether the rule from the
justifications underlying the Chimel exception.’”63 With respect to
the first rationale, to protect law enforcement safety, the Court
concluded, “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used
as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the
arrestee’s escape.”64 Law enforcement retains the ability to inspect
the exterior of the phone to ensure there is no potential use as a

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that law enforcement must obtain a
warrant before searching a cell phone, but disagreeing that the search incident to arrest doctrine is
based on the rationales discussed in Chimel. Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring). He also called on
the legislature to help balance privacy interests against the needs of law enforcement. Id. at 2496–
97. He emphasized that “it would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the twenty-first
century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth
Amendment” and that “[l]egislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to
assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost certainly will
take place in the future.” Id. at 2497–98.
60. Id. at 2495 (majority opinion).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2485–88.
63. Id. at 2485 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).
64. Id.
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weapon, but the search ends there.65 The United States and California
argued that the digital data could protect law enforcement’s safety in
other indirect ways, by alerting law enforcement that other
co-conspirators are en route to the scene of arrest.66 However, the
Court determined that although the government does have a strong
interest in protecting its officers, permitting a warrantless cell phone
search would expand the concern in Chimel that the arrestee himself
would use a weapon against the officer.67
With respect to the second Chimel rationale, destruction of
evidence, California and the U.S. government argued that cell phone
data is susceptible to destruction by either remote wiping or data
encryption.68 However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument for
several reasons. First, it determined that again the government had
expanded the justifications in Chimel by relying on remote actions of
third parties destroying or obfuscating evidence, rather than the
arrestee himself concealing evidence.69 Second, the Supreme Court
found few examples of such remote wiping or data encryption that
had destroyed evidence after a person was arrested.70 Finally, the
Court concluded that law enforcement has sufficient means to
counter the threat of remote wiping and data encryption.71 Thus, the
Court concluded that neither of the Chimel rationales was furthered
by searching the digital data on a cell phone.
Second, the Court refused to extend its decision in Robinson to
the case of cell phones because “[a] search of the information on a
cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical
search considered in Robinson.”72 The Court declined to extend
Robinson for two main reasons. Primarily, it concluded that cell
phones are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other
objects an arrestee might keep on his person based on their immense
storage capacities.73 Cell phones collect a variety of information such
as addresses, bank statements, and videos, in a single device.74 By
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2485–86.
Id. at 2486.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2487.
Id. at 2485.
Id. at 2489.
Id.
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compiling such specific information about all aspects of an arrestee’s
life, law enforcement can easily reconstruct his personal life dating
back several years.75 This type of expansive search, the Court
concluded, was completely distinguishable from a search of a
cigarette pack’s contents.76
Subsequently, the Court refused to extend Robinson to cell
phones because of the existence of the cloud,77 which allows law
enforcement to access digital information that may not even be
stored on the device itself.78 Thus, a search of cell phones would
likely “extend well beyond papers and effects in the physical
proximity of the arrestee,”79 which represents yet another expansion
of the search incident to arrest doctrine.
Third, the Supreme Court rejected the U.S. government and
California’s argument that law enforcement should be able to search
a cell phone when “it is reasonable to believe that the phone contains
evidence of the crime of arrest,” the standard in Gant.80 In so doing,
the Court determined that Gant is unique to searches of vehicles, not
to cell phones carried on the arrestee.81 Additionally, Gant prohibited
searches of evidence of past crimes; however, in the context of cell
phones, “it is reasonable to expect that incriminating information will
be found on a cell phone regardless of when the crime occurred.”82
Thus, the Court refused to extend the reasoning in Gant to cell
phones, preventing law enforcement from conducting warrantless
searches of cell phones even if searching only for evidence of the
crime of arrest.83
Finally, the Court noted that there may be circumstances where
law enforcement’s need to search a cell phone outweighs an
arrestee’s privacy concerns.84 In those situations, there still remains
the exception for exigent circumstances, which will allow the police
75. Id. at 2489–90.
76. Id. at 2488–89.
77. The cloud is “an off-site storage system” used for storing digital data. Users can access
data stored in the cloud from any location or device that has access to the Internet. Jonathan
Strickland, How Cloud Storage Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com
/cloud-computing/cloud-storage.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).
78. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2492.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2494.
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to search a cell phone without a warrant if the need is so compelling
that it justifies a warrantless search as reasonable.85 Thus, although
the Court concluded that law enforcement must obtain a warrant
before searching a cell phone’s data, it provided an exception to this
general rule to better balance the government’s needs against the
arrestee’s privacy interests.
V. SUPREME COURT TAKES AN IMPORTANT STEP BUT MISSES AN
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS OTHER PRESSING ISSUES
The Supreme Court finally addressed technology’s impact on
the Fourth Amendment and correctly recognized that certain
technologies require additional Fourth Amendment protection based
on the magnitude of data present on a device using such
technologies. However, the Court missed an important opportunity to
address greater privacy concerns about warrantless searches of smart
devices in general, not simply cell phones. This part discusses both
the Supreme Court’s advances and its shortcomings, offering a
potential solution that could have better addressed growing privacy
concerns.
A. The Supreme Court Evolves the Fourth Amendment
to Address Modern Concerns
It is no secret that the Supreme Court has been criticized for its
failure to understand and address technology and its effects on
Fourth Amendment privacy concerns. Specifically, the Court “has
long been mocked, sometimes justifiably, as an old-fashioned,
tech-phobic institution.”86 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court took an
important and significant step in Riley toward bringing the Fourth
Amendment into the modern era.87 Notably, the Supreme Court has
come a long way since questioning the difference between an email
and a pager.88 Many have described the unanimous decision here as a
“resounding victory for digital privacy” and a “‘no-duh’ moment for

85. Id.
86. Farhad Manjoo, The Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES BITS (June 26, 2014, 3:58
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/the-tech-savvy-supreme-court/?_php=true&_type
=blogs&_r=0.
87. Millhiser, supra note 2.
88. Manjoo, supra note 86.
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American justice.”89 The Supreme Court appears to recognize that
the long-standing search incident to arrest doctrine, almost a century
old, may be outdated in today’s digital society.90 It determined that
this exception to the general warrant requirement has limits, and it
set the limit at cell phones.91
Legal scholars have proffered several theories as to why the
Supreme Court is finally addressing technology. Some scholars
wondered whether the Justices were imagining what it would be like
for law enforcement to search through their cell phones without a
warrant.92 Others have speculated that the Justices were engaging in
what one scholar refers to as equilibrium-adjustment, where courts
“respond to . . . new facts by adjusting legal rules to restore the
preexisting balance of police power.”93 When “changing
technology . . . expands police power, threatening civil liberties,
courts can tighten Fourth Amendment rules to restore the status
quo.”94 Thus, pursuant to this theory, the Supreme Court likely may
have seen an expansion of police power that undermined privacy
concerns implicated by warrantless searches of cell phones.95
Furthermore, the Justices who initially created and developed
this doctrine could not have understood how it would affect privacy
concerns in a society in which “many people carry a small device in
their pocket that can access years worth of their emails and text
messages, that can reveal a suspect’s finances and romantic partners,
and that may contain extensive photo and video evidence of how
they lead their lives.”96 Cell phones’ Global Positioning Systems
89. Sarah Jeong, The Supreme Court Finally Understands Technology—And It’s About
Damn Time, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2014/jun/25/supreme-court-cellphones-john-roberts-precedent-privacy.
90. Millhiser, supra note 2.
91. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
92. Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., The Supreme Court Justices Have Cellphones, Too, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2014, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/opinion/linda
-greenhouse-the-supreme-court-justices-have-cellphones-too.html?hp&action=click&pgtype
=Homepage&module=c-column-top-span-region&region=c-column-top-span-region&WT.nav=
c -column-top-span-region&_r=0.
93. Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 482 (2011–2012) [hereinafter Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory]; Orin Kerr, Are Jones
and Riley Explained by the Justices Imagining Themselves as Targets?, WASH. POST VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014
/06 /26/are-jones-and-riley-explained-by-the-justices-imagining-themselves-as-targets/.
94. Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory, supra note 93, at 482.
95. See id.
96. Millhiser, supra note 2.
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(GPS) also pose significant privacy concerns not present at the
drafting of the Fourth Amendment.97 With current technology, as
long as a cell phone is turned on, it “registers its position with cell
towers every few minutes, whether the phone is being used or not.”98
Additionally, cell phone carriers maintain records of this location
data, allowing the government to obtain a user’s location details,
including the friends he visits, what doctor he sees, and even how
often he attends church.99 Chimel considered the search of a
three-bedroom house, and Robinson analyzed the search of a
cigarette pack’s contents.100 But Riley considered the propriety of
searches of devices that carry far more information than could ever
fit on an arrestee’s person or in areas within his immediate control in
its physical form. Society is rapidly entering a digital age, and new
technological devices “defy the rationales for old rules, demanding
changes in the law.”101 In Riley, the Supreme Court finally
demonstrated that it understood this notion, recognizing that cell
phones are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other
items typically searched incident to an arrest.102
B. The Supreme Court Failed to Fully Protect Additional
Privacy Rights Relevant to the Modern Era
The Supreme Court correctly recognized that cell phones present
unique privacy issues not readily apparent at the time the Founding
Fathers drafted the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court failed to
address privacy concerns that arise from non–cell phone smart
devices, which will likely be an issue in the coming years. Thus, the
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to address smart devices in
general, as opposed to the limited issue of cell phones. This section
discusses both the problems with the Supreme Court’s limited
97. How the Government Is Tracking Your Movements, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/how-government-tracking-your-movements (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 754 (1969).
101. Byron Kish, Cellphone Searches: Works Like a Computer, Protected Like a Pager?, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 473 (2011); Mason Clutter, Symposium: The Court Starts to Catch Up
with Technology, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014
/06/symposium-the-court-starts-to-catch-up-with-technology/;
Richard
Re,
Symposium:
Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:37 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourth-amendment/.
102. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
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decision and one way it could have better protected growing privacy
interests.
1. Problems with Riley
The Supreme Court’s decision in Riley suffers from three main
flaws: (1) it does not address the increasingly pressing concern of
smart devices as opposed to only cell phones; (2) it provides little
guidance on how to apply Riley’s reasoning to searches incident to
arrest of these other devices; and (3) it has the potential to confuse
lower courts about when adherence to pre-digital precedent is
unnecessary. The first problem stems from the Supreme Court’s
limitation of its decision to cell phones. In general, as smartphones
become more affordable, the number of people trading their ordinary
cell phones for smartphones has increased exponentially.103
Specifically, the percentage of Americans that have a cell phone that
is not a smartphone has dropped 33 percent since 2005.104
Additionally, while only 25 percent of Americans over the age of
sixty-five have a smartphone, 88 percent of eighteen to twenty-nine
year-olds report having a smartphone.105 The percentage of
Americans who also own other smart devices, such as iPads,106
Kindles,107 iPods,108 and Apple Watches109 has likewise continued to
grow since 2005.110
103. Smartphone Users Worldwide Will Total 1.75 Billion in 2014, EMARKETER (Jan. 16,
2014), http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Smartphone-Users-Worldwide-Will-Total-175-Billion
-2014/1010536.
104. Bruce Drake, Americans with Just Basic Cell Phones Are a Dwindling Breed, FACTANK
(Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/09/americans-wi1th-just-basic-cell
-phones-are-a-dwindling-breed/.
105. Id.
106. An iPad is a tablet with a 9.7 inch screen equipped with Wi-Fi and optional 3G or 4G
cellular access. It is “[d]esigned for Web browsing, e-mail, e-book reading and entertainment”
and can hold up to “128 gigabytes of data.” Definition of: iPad, PCMAG,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/61359/ipad (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
107. A Kindle is a 6.5 inch by 4.5 inch eReader that is WiFi enabled and has a storage
capacity of approximately two gigabytes, the equivalent of 1,500 books, and additional unlimited
storage in the cloud. Definition of: Kindle, PCMAG, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term
/58565/kindle (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
108. An iPod, specifically the newest model known as an iPod Touch, is “essentially an
iPhone without the phone,” equipped with WiFi and significant storage capacity. Definition of:
iPod Touch, PCMAG, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/58324/ipod-touch (last visited
Oct. 1, 2014).
109. The Apple Watch, Apple’s most recent product line meant to track fitness, connects to
users’ cell phones, thus allowing users to receive and send messages and receive and make phone
calls as well as access other apps, and of course, tell time. Apple Watch Unveiled: Starts at $349,
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These statistics indicate that society is increasingly using
smartphones, leaving ordinary cell phones behind, and relying more
heavily on other forms of smart devices. Thus, by limiting its
decision to cell phones, rather than extending it to smart devices, the
Supreme Court left open the question of whether law enforcement
can search other technological devices pursuant to the search
incident to arrest doctrine. Given the increase in the number of
Americans that use other forms of smart devices and the decision’s
limitation to cell phones, litigation will undoubtedly occur over
searches incident to arrest of these other devices, without much
guidance from the Supreme Court.111
The Supreme Court’s decision suffers from another flaw: it is
not easily applicable to these new forms of technology over which
litigation will likely ensue. By considering the Riley and Wurie cases
together, the Supreme Court made it more difficult to apply its
reasoning universally to other technologies.112
In Riley, the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge the important
distinction between smartphones and other cell phones.113
Specifically, the cell phone in Riley was an iPhone equipped with
smart technology whereas the cell phone in Wurie was a non-smart
ordinary flip phone.114 The Supreme Court’s main reasoning in
refusing to apply the search incident to arrest doctrine to cell phones
was the colossal amount of information stored on these devices that
is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other items
typically searched incident to arrest.115 It recognized that because of
their complex technology, cell phones “could just as easily be called
cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders,
libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”116
However, what the Supreme Court did not consider is that these
characteristics are only typical of smartphones and other smart

Coming Early 2015 (Hands-On), CNET (Sept. 11, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.cnet.com/products
/apple-watch/.
110. Drake, supra note 104.
111. Noah Marks, Unfortunately, Resolving Wurie Perfunctorily May Weaken Riley, HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. (June 25, 2014), http://www3.law.harvard.edu/journals/hlpr/2014/06/riley/.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2481 (2014); Marks, supra note 111.
115. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
116. Id.
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devices, not the flip phone found in Wurie.117 Specifically, ordinary
cell phones or flip phones are “not commonly used as newspapers or
televisions, and most are not Wi-Fi enabled, come with minimal
memory, have few or no apps, have limited contacts, and cannot
effectively surf the web, sync with the cloud, or download files.”118
Additionally, the Court failed to consider that such characteristics,
while not typical of an ordinary cell phone, are common to many
other smart devices increasingly used by many Americans, such as
iPads and iPods.
By considering the two cases together and failing to address the
differences between a cell phone and a smartphone, the Supreme
Court made it difficult to discern what the important factors are in
determining whether law enforcement may search a specific device
incident to an arrest.119 It would be reasonable for a court to assume
that the ability to make and receive phone calls is dispositive, given
the Court’s grouping together of the general category of cell
phones.120
Another possibility, however, is for a court to assume that there
is a spectrum between the privacy interests at stake in an ordinary
cell phone versus a smartphone, under which devices that fall
somewhere in between could not be searched incident to an arrest
without a warrant. Many of the other smart devices such as the
Kindle, Apple Watch, and iPad implicate fewer privacy concerns
than the iPhone in Riley, but more privacy concerns then the cell
phone in Wurie.121 Perhaps courts could hold that these other devices
are not searchable without a warrant because the arrestee’s privacy
interests in these devices are somewhere between the two devices
discussed in Riley. Applying this case to other smart devices will
likely perplex courts because the Supreme Court did not address the
important distinction between an ordinary cell phone and a
smartphone.
Third, the Supreme Court, in distinguishing Robinson from
Riley, may have sent a confusing message to lower courts trying to
apply pre-digital precedent to digital data. The Supreme Court made
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Marks, supra note 111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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clear in Robinson that, incident to an arrest, law enforcement “can
open containers located on a person or in their immediate grabbable
zone without having any independent probable cause to search those
containers.”122 However, until recently, many of the cases relying on
Robinson related to searches of tangible evidence, namely drugs and
firearms.123 In Riley, the Supreme Court easily distinguished the
cigarette pack and heroin capsules from the digital data stored in a
cell phone. However, the Court sent an unfortunate message to lower
courts—do not strictly adhere to pre-digital precedent as applied to
digital Fourth Amendment questions.124 Thus, with respect to new
technologies other than cell phones, distinct circuit splits are likely to
emerge,125 as courts may feel entitled to certain leeway in adhering
or failing to adhere to pre-digital precedent.
Although the Supreme Court correctly decided the issue before
it and made important advances in bringing the Fourth Amendment
into the modern era, its decision is not as powerful, decisive, and
relevant as needed. The Supreme Court took a step back by grouping
flip phones, largely a thing of the past, with smartphones and failed
to consider the privacy concerns of new and increasing smart
devices. Additionally, by considering both the Wurie and Riley cases
together without addressing their important differences, the Court
made its decision inapplicable to these other emerging areas of
technology, or, if applicable, largely confusing.
2. Potential Solution—Framing the Issue More Broadly
The Supreme Court could have better addressed present and
future technology concerns by framing the issue differently to
answer a broader question. The Supreme Court framed its decision as
answering a common question, whether the police may conduct a
warrantless search incident to arrest of a cell phone.126 However, as
discussed above, the Court’s consideration of this common question
suffers from several flaws that hinder the Supreme Court from fully
bringing the Fourth Amendment into the modern era.127
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The Court had an easily available solution; it could have framed
the issue more broadly to encompass both cell phones and other
smart devices. The issue could and should have been framed as
follows: whether law enforcement without a warrant can search a cell
phone or device equipped with smart technology incident to an
arrest. In so doing, it would answer the question of ordinary cell
phones, smartphones, and non–cell phone smart devices, such as
iPads, Kindles, and the like, thus accomplishing far more than the
Court did in its current opinion. Additionally, as mentioned above,
there are stated concerns regarding an increase in litigation over the
future of warrantless searches;128 by framing the issue this way, the
Court would have addressed and eliminated these concerns.
To do so, the Supreme Court would have had to acknowledge
the distinction between Wurie’s cell phone and Riley’s smartphone
but easily could have held that both present significant privacy
concerns such that a warrant is always required. By framing the issue
in this slightly different way, the Supreme Court could have easily
made its decision applicable to any of the aforementioned devices, as
well as many new technologies likely to emerge. Thus, had the
Supreme Court chosen this route, not only would it have brought the
Fourth Amendment into the present day, it would have issued a
decision that is equally applicable in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v.
California represents a very important step toward bringing the
Fourth Amendment into the modern era and providing more
protection for individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, the decision simultaneously suffers from several flaws in
failing to consider the decision’s effect on other non–cell phone
smart devices, which are only increasing in usage. By failing to
consider these other devices, the Court opened itself to future
litigation applying Riley to these devices, especially considering the
Court’s inability to distinguish an ordinary cell phone from a smart
phone. Finally, by distinguishing Riley from Robinson, the Court
may have sent an unfortunate and confusing message to lower courts
about adhering to pre-digital precedent—sometimes it is not
128. See Marks, supra note 111.
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necessary. All of these concerns could and should have been avoided
by framing the issue more broadly, so as to include both cell phones
and smart devices. The Supreme Court ultimately came to the correct
conclusion in its decision, but it may have created more work for
itself in the near future answering this same search incident to arrest
question applied to even newer technologies. The next few years will
elucidate
whether
this
decision
was
too
limited.

